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Shackling Short Sellers: The 2008
Shorting Ban
Ekkehart Boehmer
EDHEC Business School
Charles M. Jones
Columbia Business School
Xiaoyan Zhang
Krannert School of Management, Purdue University
In September 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) temporarily
banned most short sales in nearly 1,000 financial stocks. We examine the ban’s effect on
market quality, shorting activity, the aggressiveness of short sellers, and stock prices. The
ban’s effects are concentrated in larger stocks; there is little effect on firms in the lower half
of the size distribution. Although shorting activity drops by about 77% in large-cap stocks,
stock prices appear unaffected by the ban. All but the smallest quartile of firms subject to
the ban suffer a severe degradation in market quality. (JEL G14)
For the most part, financial economists consider short sellers to be the “good
guys,” unearthing overvalued companies and contributing to efficient stock
prices. Even as late as the summer of 2007, regulators in the United States
seemed to share this view, as they made life easier for short sellers by repealing
the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE’s) uptick rule and other short-sale
price tests that had impeded shorting activity since the Great Depression (see
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009) for an analysis of this event). However,
short sellers are often the scapegoats when share prices fall sharply, and
regulators in the United States did a sharp U-turn in 2008, imposing tight new
restrictions on short sellers as the financial crisis worsened. In September 2008,
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) surprised the investment
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community by adopting an emergency order that temporarily banned most
short sales in nearly 1,000 financial stocks. In this paper, we study changes
in various liquidity measures, the rate of short sales, the aggressiveness of
short sellers, and in stock prices before, during, and after the shorting ban. We
compare banned stocks to a control group of nonbanned stocks to identify these
effects.
We find that during the shorting ban, shorting activity in large-cap stocks
subject to the ban drops by about 77%. All but the smallest stocks subject
to the ban (those in the smallest size quartile) suffer a severe degradation
in market quality, as measured by spreads, price impacts, and intraday
volatility. In contrast, the smallest-quartile stocks see little impact from the
shorting ban. Stock price effects are difficult to discern, as there is substantial
contemporaneous, confounding news about the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) and other government programs to assist the financial sector. When we
look at firms that are added later to the ban list (for these firms, confounding
contemporaneous events are less of a problem), we do not find a price bump at
all. In fact, these stocks consistently underperform during the whole period the
ban is in effect. This suggests that the shorting ban did not provide an artificial
boost in prices.
Given this backdrop, it is not surprising that several papers contemporane-
ously address the recent short sale bans. Most are complementary, focusing on
different aspects of the shorting restrictions. For example, our paper focuses on
intraday data to shed light on the U.S. ban’s effects on equity trading activity
and market quality, whereas Battalio and Schultz (2011) study individual
equity options markets during the ban (see also Grundy, Lim, and Verwijmeren
2012). Harris, Namvar, and Phillips (2013) gauge stock price effects, whereas
Kolasinski, Reed, and Thornock (2013) study naked shorting prohibitions and
analyze stock price responses to short interest announcements during 2008.
Bailey and Zheng (2013) show that short selling has a stabilizing effect on
prices during the crisis periods that surround the shorting ban. Ni and Pan
(2011) show that it takes longer for negative information to be incorporated
into share prices during the ban.
Closest to our analysis is the contemporaneous work by Beber and Pagano
(2013), who look at an international panel of stocks that are subject to different
types of shorting bans. Their main result is that shorting bans increase end-
of-day bid-ask spreads, implying a decline in stock liquidity when shorting
constraints are more severe. They also find some evidence of slower price
discovery during shorting bans but detect no effect on share prices. Our study
on the U.S. shorting ban complements Beber and Pagano’s (2013) cross-country
analysis well. Their data are broader as they cover thirty different countries, but
this breadth confines the analysis to broadly available data. Specifically, Beber
and Pagano (2013) use prices and the indicative (and possibly nonbinding) end-
of-day quoted spreads from Datastream, rather than actual intraday transaction
costs. They cannot measure short-selling activity across countries and therefore
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do not know to which extent shorting bans were actually enforced across
countries. In contrast, we use intraday data on trades and binding quotes to
compute the standard measures of market quality (including effective spreads,
realized spread, price impact, and intraday volatility) and link them to ban-
induced changes in short-selling intensity. We also employ daily data on actual
shorting flows to gauge the extent to which the ban is effective in reducing short
selling across stocks and how this reduction affects market quality.Additionally,
we use metrics of how difficult it is to borrow a stock and whether a stock is
heavily traded by algorithmic traders to examine channels that potentially link
the shorting ban to market quality in the affected stocks.
Owing mostly to these differences in the nature of the underlying data, Beber
and Pagano’s (2013) tests primarily describe how the effects of shorting bans
differ across countries and how bans on naked shorting and bans on covered
shorting have different effects. In contrast, we analyze one market in depth for
which we can precisely measure changes in the quantity of shorting (a variable
not available to Beber and Pagano 2013) and then link these changes to variation
in the market quality of affected stocks. In terms of methodology, we construct
difference-in-differences tests that allow us to isolate the effects of the ban,
whereas Beber and Pagano (2013) employ a firm-day panel that gives more
weight to firms in countries that experience longer bans than to firms in countries
with short bans (such as the United States). Moreover, Beber and Pagano (2013)
restrict their main parameters to be the same across countries in the interest of
parsimony. This comes at the cost of ignoring cross-country differences, such as
differences in financial market development, information environment, investor
protection regulation, etc. In contrast, our one-country study is complementary
in the sense that it neither requires subjective decisions on how to weight each
observation nor suffers from cross-country heterogeneity. Instead, it allows a
much more detailed look at the nature of equity trading before, during, and
after the ban.
Other regulatory restrictions on shorting have been studied as well. Jones
(2012) studies a variety of restrictions in the United States during the Great
Depression and observes large stock price effects but only modest effects on
liquidity. Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang
(2009) find small market-quality effects associated with the repeal of the U.S.
uptick rule in 2005 and 2007. Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) find slower
adjustment to negative information in countries with more severe shorting
restrictions, as predicted by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), and Ho (1996)
finds that shorting restrictions in Singapore increase volatility. Rhee (2003)
finds some evidence of price effects in Japan following imposition of an uptick
rule there.
Most previous theoretical and empirical work on shorting restrictions focuses
on share price effects. There is less theory linking shorting restrictions to market
quality. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) point out that short sellers are more
likely to be informed, as they would never initiate a short sale for liquidity
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reasons.1 Based on this insight, their model predicts that if shorting is banned,
bid-ask spreads will actually narrow, because liquidity providers will face less
adverse selection. In contrast to their hypothesis, a shorting ban could hurt
market quality if short sellers are important liquidity providers. Banning short
sellers could reduce competition in liquidity provision, worsening the terms
of trade for liquidity demanders. Our empirical investigation distinguishes
between these two competing hypotheses.
The paper is organized as follows. A detailed time line of events related
to the shorting ban is the subject of Section 1. Section 2 discusses the data,
including proprietary intraday NYSE, NASDAQ, and BATS data on short sales,
as well as our matching procedures. Section 3 discusses the methodology we
use, particularly the firm fixed effects models used to isolate the effect of the
shorting ban. Main empirical results are discussed in Section 4 with analysis of
changes in shorting activity, changes in effective spreads, short-term volatility,
and other market quality measures, as well as effects on share prices. Section 5
provides more analysis of the end of the ban and on interactions of the ban with
hard-to-borrow stocks and algorithmic trading. Section 6 concludes.
1. Time Line of Events
The temporary ban on the shorting of financial stocks is the broadest and, at
the time, probably the most unexpected, in a sequence of regulatory efforts to
throw sand in the gears of short sellers and make it more difficult or costly
to take a short position in embattled financial stocks. The first move in this
direction took place in July 2008, when the SEC issued an emergency order
restricting naked shorting (where the short seller fails to borrow shares and
deliver them to the buyer on the settlement date) in nineteen financial stocks.2
After the emergency order expired in mid-August, the SEC returned on the
evening of Wednesday, September 17, with a permanent ban on naked shorting
in all U.S. stocks, effective at 12:01 a.m. (EST) on Thursday, September 18. On
Thursday, September 18, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority
(FSA) instituted a temporary ban on short sales in thirty-two financial stocks,
effective the next day (Friday, September 19). The FSA shorting ban was
accompanied by a requirement to disclose short positions in these stocks that
were in excess of 0.25% of the shares outstanding. Both measures were to
remain in force until January 16, 2009.
That same day (Thursday, September 18, 2008), after the U.S. market closed
for the day, the SEC matched the FSA, surprising the market with a temporary
1 Empirical evidence finds that short sellers are well informed and enhance price discovery. See, for example,
Dechow et al. (2001), Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman (2006), Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008),
Boehmer and Wu (2013), Saffi and Siggurdsson (2011), and Aitken et al. (1998), among others.
2 Market makers were exempt from the July 2008 emergency order for naked short sales executed as a result of
bona fide market-making activity. Kolasinski, Reed, and Thornock (2013) show that the July 2008 emergency
order made it more costly to borrow shares in the affected stocks and reduced shorting activity in those stocks.
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ban on all short sales in 797 financial stocks.3 The SEC’s emergency order
(release no. 34-58592) was issued pursuant to its authority in Section 12(k)(2)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and it was effective immediately. The
initial order covered ten business days, terminating at 11:59 p.m. (EST) on
October 2, 2008, but could be extended under the law to last for a maximum
of thirty calendar days.4
The details of the shorting ban are important for understanding the effect of
the event. For example, the last time shorting was banned in the United States
was in September 1931, when the NYSE banned all short sales in the wake of
England’s announcement that it was abandoning the gold standard. As Jones
(2012) recounts, all short sales were banned in that case, including short sales
by specialists and other market makers, which provoked something akin to a
short squeeze by buyers who realized that at least in the short-term there would
be few that could stand in the way of their efforts to drive up prices.
In 2008, the SEC did not repeat the NYSE’s earlier mistake. The emergency
order contained a limited exception for market makers (defined in the
emergency order as “registered market makers, block positioners, or other
market makers obligated to quote in the over-the-counter market”) that were
selling short as part of bona fide market making activity. Also, the shorting ban
became effective on a so-called “triple witching day,” the last day of trading
before expiration of index options, equity options on individual stocks, and
index futures. Barclay, Hendershott, and Jones (2008) provide some recent
evidence on the very large order imbalances and excess volatility in the equity
market that are present on these days. To prevent large price swings around these
expirations, the SEC decided to grant options market makers a 24-hour delay
so that they too could sell short as part of their market-making and hedging
activities.
The ban was implemented quite hastily, and many details evolved over time.
On Sunday, September 21, the SEC announced (in release 34-58611) technical
amendments to the original ban, all of which were effective immediately.
There were three main elements. First, the SEC delegated all decisions about
the ban status of a listed firm to the exchanges. Listing markets were to
designate the individual financial institutions to be covered and were authorized
to exclude firms from the ban list on their request. Second, options market
makers were to remain exempt from the shorting ban for the duration of
the emergency order, and the SEC clarified that all registered market makers
were exempt, including over-the-counter (OTC) market makers and those
making markets in exchange traded funds (ETFs). Third, the SEC stated that
“a market maker may not effect a short sale … if the market maker knows
3 The emergency order claimed to cover 799 stocks, but only 797 were actually listed in the order.
4 At the same time, the Commission announced that all institutional short sellers would have to report their daily
shorting activity, and the Commission announced aggressive investigations into possible manipulation by short
sellers.
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that the customer’s or counterparty’s transaction will result in the customer or
counterparty establishing or increasing an economic net short position (i.e.,
through actual positions, derivatives, or otherwise) in the issued share capital
of a firm covered by this Order.” This language seems designed to discourage
the use of listed or OTC derivatives to take a bearish position in the covered
stocks, though its main result may have been to provide market makers with
considerable incentives to avoid knowledge of a customer or counterparty’s net
positions.
On Monday, September 22, the three major exchanges announced a number
of additions to the list of banned stocks. For example, the NYSE added thirty-
two stocks to the list on this day and forty-four stocks on the following
day. Many of these additions were clearly financial stocks that were simply
overlooked by the SEC as it drew up its initial list, but industrial firms with a
large finance subsidiary (such as General Motors and General Electric) were
added to the shorting ban list as well. Additions continued on subsequent
days at a slower pace. For example, the NYSE added 13, 9, and 7 stocks
on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, respectively. Also, four NYSE firms and
four NASDAQ firms asked to be removed from the shorting ban list on various
days. These removals included real estate investment trusts (REITs) as well
as a few broker-dealers and asset managers, who may have been concerned
about looking hypocritical given that at least some of their revenues relied on
the continued viability of short sales. For some of our tests, we examine these
withdrawing firms separately.
On October 2, 2008, at the end of the initial ten-day effective period, the
SEC extended the ban to the earlier of October 17, 2008 or three business days
following enactment of TARP (formally known as H.R. 1424, the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008). President Bush signed the bill into law on
the afternoon of Friday, October 3, immediately after it passed both houses of
Congress, and the SEC then announced that the ban would expire at 11:59 p.m.
(EST) on Wednesday, October 8, 2008. As of October 9, shorting was again
permitted in all listed stocks as long as market participants complied with the
requirement to borrow shares in advance, as mandated by the naked shorting
ban, which continued to remain in effect.
2. Data
Most of the analysis covers the period fromAugust 1 through October 31, 2008.
We also examine stock returns through the end of 2008. We merge data from
six different sources. Stock returns are from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP), and the TAQ database is used to calculate market quality and
other intraday measures. The NYX and NASDAQ Web sites provide dates and
details about stocks initially included on, added to, and/or deleted from the
shorting ban list. From the NYSE, NASDAQ, and BATS, we have data on
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all executed short sales from August 1, 2008 through October 31, 2008.5 The
format is the same as the data required to be made public from January 2005
to July 2007 under Regulation SHO. For each transaction executed on one of
these venues involving one or more short sellers, a record identifies the time
of the transaction, the ticker symbol, the trade price, and the share volume that
involves a short seller. Finally, we use “easy-to-borrow” lists provided by a
major prime broker. Each morning, these lists indicate which stocks can be
shorted without restrictions on that day. The typical list in fall 2008 contains
the vast majority of listed stocks, around 5,300 names. Being included on this
list tells traders that there are no particular impediments to shorting this stock
on that day. Consequently, we classify stocks that are not included on this list
as hard to borrow. These reports are available to us from September 2, 2008
through September 17, 2008, covering the two weeks just before the shorting
ban was imposed.
To be included in the sample, stocks must be listed on the NYSE or NASDAQ
from December 31, 2007 through October 31, 2008, because we create a
matched sample based on trading activity during the first half of 2008. Based
on the match to CRSP, we retain only common stocks (CRSP share codes
10 and 11), which means we exclude securities such as warrants, preferred
shares, American depositary receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds, and REITs.
After applying these filters, there are 665 stocks in the sample out of the original
SEC list of 797 stocks subject to the shorting ban, and an additional 62 stocks
in our sample later become subject to the shorting ban, for a total of 727 NYSE
and NASDAQ common stocks in the sample that are subject to the shorting
ban at some point. Table 1, Panel A, provides details on the filters applied.
We create a matched control sample of 727 stocks for which shorting was
never banned. These stocks are matched by listing exchange, the presence or
absence of listed options, market capitalization at the end of 2007, and dollar
trading volume from January through July 2008. As a distance metric, we
compute the absolute value of the proportional market-cap difference between
the nonbanned match candidate and the banned stock plus the analogous
absolute value of the proportional dollar trading volume difference. For each
stock subject to the ban, we choose with replacement the nonbanned stock that
is listed on the same exchange, has the same options listing status, and has the
smallest distance measure. For each ban stock and each matched firm, we then
obtain all trade and quote information from TAQ during our sample period.
Panel B of Table 1 characterizes the quality of the matching procedure. We
present results for the full sample and four size quartiles, to better illustrate
differences across size groups. For each firm-size quartile, we report the
average percentage distance of the two matching variables. Market cap is
5 Based on October 2008 market share statistics reported by the exchanges, these three organizations account for
over 76% of total equity trading volume. The NYSE Group’s market share statistics include trading on ARCA,
but we do not have ARCA short sale data, so we probably have somewhat less than 76% of total shorting activity.
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barely distinguishable between the ban firms and the matched control firms
within each quartile (and is statistically indistinguishable for the entire sample,
which is not tabulated). The median pairwise size difference is less than 0.4%
in each quartile and is not significantly different from zero, except in one case.
Dollar volumes are also well matched, although significant differences remain
for the two smaller size quartiles. Even in the smallest quartile, however, the
median difference is only 5%, and it is only 2.2% in the next smallest quartile.
Overall, the two samples appear to be well matched during the preban period,
and matching quality tends to be better in the larger size quartiles. Note that
in the regression tests, the set of control variables also includes these pairwise
differences in market cap and dollar volume, to ensure that the results are not
driven by differences in these stock characteristics between the two groups.
Table 1, Panel B, also reveals that most financials subject to the ban are
quite small. The median December 2007 market caps for quartiles 1 and 2 are
only $46.5 million and $138.9 million, respectively. In fact, all of the stocks in
these two quartiles are in the bottom market cap decile based on NYSE break
points. Similarly, the median stock in quartile 3 would find itself in the ninth
NYSE market cap decile. Only the largest quartile of banned stocks would not
be considered small-cap. The median stock in quartile 4 would be in the fourth
NYSE decile. Of course, there are quite a few large cap financials, and in some
of our tests, we consider these large financial firms separately.
In robustness tests, we also consider noncommon stocks and matches based
on industry. Specifically, we take all three-digit SIC codes for which at least
one firm appears on the ban list and at least one firm does not. Then we exclude
ADRs, closed-end funds (but not REITs), ETFs, and partnerships. For each
of the sixty-two ban list firms in this subset, we then find a matching firm
that is listed on the same exchange and minimizes our distance metric based
on market cap and volume. This subsample is small, because in most of the
financial industries, all stocks were subject to the ban. Thus, this matching
procedure yields a sample that is dominated by firms in nonfinancial industries
with modest financial arms. It also differs from the base sample in that securities
other than common stocks are included.
To create a subset of large, systemically important firms for separate analysis,
we identify the nineteen large financials that were subject to the SEC’s
temporary emergency ban on naked shorting in July 2008. These firms included
all of the primary dealers in Treasury securities as well as Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, so this list includes the largest investment and commercial banks
with the most extensive debt securities market operations. Eight institutions
on this list survive our filters, including Bank of America, Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and J.P. Morgan Chase. These firms were probably
the ones expected to receive the most government assistance, and we refer to
this group as the “largest TARP firms.” We examine them separately, because it
appears the shorting ban was designed in part to assist these large, systemically
important firms.
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3. Methodology
We describe the effects of the shorting ban graphically and in firm-pair fixed
effects panel regressions. Most of the figures compare the 665 sample stocks
on the original ban list to the 665 matched control stocks for which shorting is
never banned. We use this subset of banned stocks in the figures because the
event dates are the same for all of them, making it easy to visually identify
the effects of imposing and ending the ban by comparing banned stocks to
otherwise similar nonbanned stocks.
Our panel regression analyses incorporate all 727×2=1,454 stocks in the
sample, including stocks that were added to the ban list after September 19 and
the matching control stocks. Using this sample and various subsets, we estimate
the following fixed effects model for a variety of left-hand side variables Yit
measured for matched pair i on day t :
Yit =αi +βD
BAN
it +θXit +εit , (1)
where Yit is the measured quantity Y for the banned stock less the measured
quantity for its nonbanned match. On the right-hand side, a matched pair fixed
effect is present, and DBAN is an indicator variable set equal to one if and only
if the shorting ban is in effect for the banned stock in matched pair i on day t .
Also included is Xit , a vector of pairwise differences for the following control
variables: market cap, dollar trading volume, the proportional daily range of
transaction prices, and the daily volume-weighted average share price (VWAP).
The matched pair fixed effect means that we take out any differences between
two stocks in a pair that are present during the nonban period. The control
variables are designed to pick up time-variation in the matching variables as
well as any effects due to volatility or share price level, though it turns out that
none of those effects are important—all of our inference is unchanged when we
exclude these control variables.Thus, our overall strategy is to identify the effect
of the ban on a particular quantity Y by comparing banned stocks to matching
nonbanned stocks during the ban versus at other times. Said another way, this
panel is a differences-in-differences methodology that can accommodate the
staggered introduction and removal of the shorting ban across stocks.6
Statistical inference is conducted using Thompson (2011) standard errors.
This technique allows for both time-series and cross-sectional correlation of
the regression errors, as well as heteroscedasticity. In general, we find that
these robust standard errors are very similar to ordinary least squares standard
6 As a robustness check, we use a Fama-MacBeth approach that we construct as follows. We estimate model (1)
using only the 665 firms on the original ban list and their matched control firms. We omit the ban dummy and
instead add day fixed effects to the model. Fourteen of the day fixed effects represent days during the ban period
and forty represent nonban days. Their respective means are an estimate of the conditional ban and nonban paired
differences between ban and control firms. We use a two-sample t-test to see whether the mean time fixed effects
coefficient of the two sets are different from each other. This procedure produces results that are qualitatively
identical to the ones presented in the tables.
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errors, suggesting that the matched-sample methodology and control variables
are removing most of the correlation that is present across observations.7
4. Main Results
4.1 Effects on shorting activity and trading activity
Table 2 provides summary statistics on shorting activity for the different groups
of stocks before, during, and after the ban. For the 665 sample stocks on the
original ban list, short sales account for an average of 21.40% of trading volume
during the preban period fromAugust 1 through September 18. Not surprisingly,
the shorting ban had a dramatic effect on short selling activity, but shorting does
not decline to zero. During the shorting ban (September 19 through October 8),
short sales drop to 9.96% of overall trading volume for stocks on the original
ban list. Recall that market makers (including, but not limited to, specialists
and options market makers) are able to short as part of their market-making
and hedging activities, and these are probably the short sales that we observe
during the ban period. For this group of stocks, shorting then rebounds to an
average of 17.62% of trading volume during the postban period (October 9 to
October 31).
Figure 1 shows that large-cap stocks experience the sharpest reductions in
shorting. In the large-cap quartile of banned stocks, shorting averages only
6.6% of shares traded during the ban versus 28.2% in the pre- and postban
periods. In contrast, small stocks experience little change in the amount of
shorting during the ban. For the smallest market-cap quartile of banned stocks,
shorting accounts for an average of 10.5% of share volume during the ban,
versus 12.7% before and after the ban. The cross-sectional difference probably
reflects the differential importance of informal market makers. Informal market
makers are subject to the ban and tend to participate in active stocks, where
they can supply liquidity algorithmically. Traditional market makers remain
important in small-cap stocks, where algorithmic trading and liquidity supply
is less pervasive (see, e.g., Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld 2011).
These remaining short sales could reflect trades by market makers acting as
a middleman for market participants who are now forced to take an economic
short position using derivatives. For instance, a hedge fund could buy puts
on financial stocks instead of shorting them directly. An options market maker
might sell this put to the hedge fund and then delta hedge its risk by shorting the
appropriate amount of the underlying stock. As another example, a hedge fund
could short a financial stock ETF (ETFs were not subject to the shorting ban).
A market maker might purchase the ETF shares and hedge its risk by shorting
7 Thompson (2011) variance-covariance matrices are not guaranteed to be positive definite, and estimated standard
errors can turn out negative in finite samples if the true error terms are close to being independent across
observations. In about 1% of all cases, we obtain negative standard error estimates for coefficients of interest.
When this happens, we report and use White (1980) standard errors for inference.
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the stocks underlying the ETF. However, it is not possible to directly assign all
shorting during the ban to bearish traders that are attempting to circumvent the
ban on short sales, because market makers short for other reasons. For instance,
if an entity wants to take a long position in a financial stock, a market maker
may sell short to provide liquidity to that buyer. Thus, the amount of shorting
during the ban can be viewed as an upper bound on the substitution by hedge
funds and other short sellers into derivatives that were then hedged by market
makers. The low shorting numbers thus imply that little such substitution takes
place in large-cap stocks during the ban. This is corroborated by Battalio and
Schultz (2011), who show that volume in equity options on financial stocks
does not change much during the ban.
It is interesting to examine the exact timing of the decline in shorting activity.
On Thursday, September 18, the naked shorting restrictions go into effect for
all stocks. For our sample of 665 matched control stocks, shorting accounts
for only 14.1% of volume that day, compared with an average of 18.44% for
the whole preban sample period. In fact, Table 2 also shows that shorting in
nonbanned control stocks remains at a lower average level during and after the
shorting ban (16.99% of volume during the ban, 16.75% of volume during the
postban sample period), further suggesting that the naked shorting restrictions
had at least some effect on shorting activity. The large amount of shorting
activity in nonbanned stocks on September 19 is somewhat inconsistent with
this story (shorting is 30.4% of trading volume in nonbanned stocks on that
day), but there are several possible explanations. It could be that market
participants anticipated an expansion of the shorting ban and rushed to get
short positions in place. Nonbanned stocks might have served as substitutes
for banned stocks. September 19 was also a witching day, and the imminent
expirations of September options and futures could account for that day’s burst
of shorting activity in the nonbanned stocks.
Once the ban is lifted on October 9, shorting increases sharply in the banned
large-cap stocks. Figure 1 seems to indicate that a shorting gap remains between
the two groups (banned stocks versus control stocks). This gap gradually
narrows over the next week, and thereafter the two groups again exhibit similar
shorting activity. However, there is no statistical evidence of a postban gap. We
cannot reject the null that the two groups have the same shorting prevalence
during the whole postban sample period from October 9 through October 31.
In Table 3, we use panel regressions on all three shorting activity measures
to show that the ban reduced shorting activity. Based on the full sample results
reported in Panel A, the shorting ban reduces the average stock’s daily number
of trades involving a short seller by 1,791 (t =6.31). The average banned stock
sees a decline of 366,516 shares sold short per day (t =5.68), and the fraction
of trading volume involving a short seller declines by 10.7 percentage points
(t =18.24).
Panel B of Table 3 partitions the sample by market-cap quartile, confirming
the graphical evidence in Figure 1 that the shorting ban has the biggest and
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Table 3
The effect of the shorting ban on trading and shorting activity
Panel A: Coefficients in matched sample panel regressions (727 pairs)
Dep. variable BAN MKT CAP DVOL RVOL VWAP Adj. R2
(%)
Number of shorts −1,791∗∗∗ −0.131 24.994∗∗∗ 2,413∗∗ −11 61
Shorting volume −366,516∗∗∗ −81.743∗∗ 5,615.302∗∗∗ 1,253,968∗ 4,295 57
RELSS −0.107∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗ −0.001 10
Number of trades −733∗∗∗ −0.158 49.184∗∗∗ 8,672∗∗∗ −52 81
DVOL −6,475,625 1,016.966 116,963,880∗∗∗ −670,285 43
Panel B: Ban dummy coefficients for regressions on market cap quartile subsamples
Dep. variable Quartile 1 (smallest) Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 (largest)
Shorting volume −723 −1,670 −47,088∗∗∗ −1,535,593∗∗∗
Number of shorts −3 −17∗∗∗ −320∗∗∗ −6,810∗∗∗
RELSS −0.030∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗
Number of trades −7∗ −25∗∗∗ −391∗∗∗ −3,752∗∗∗
DVOL −8,646 −18,309 −966,695∗ −43,041,440∗∗∗
Number of pairs 181 182 182 182
Panel C: Ban dummy coefficients for regressions on various sample subsets
Dep. variable (A) Largest TARP
firms
(B) Industry match (C) Later additions
only
(D) Withdrawn
firms
Shorting volume −10,520,794∗∗∗ −560,392∗∗∗ −922,259∗∗∗ −50,638∗
Number of shorts −40,583∗∗∗ −2,618∗∗∗ −4,153∗∗∗ −304
RELSS −0.146∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
Number of trades −10,021∗∗∗ −1,612∗∗∗ −2,859∗∗∗ −180
DVOL −165,996,682 −26,008,337∗∗∗ −24,304,647∗ −6,771,996
Number of pairs 8 62 61 4
This table reports how the shorting ban affects trading and shorting activity. Firm fixed effects regressions of short-selling
activity or trading volume measures on a ban dummy and other explanatory variables, using a daily panel of matched
stock pairs from 8/1/2008 to 10/31/2008. Each sample stock subject to the shorting ban is matched to a similar stock for
which shorting was not banned (see Table 2 for details). Panel A presents results for the overall sample of 727 matched
stock pairs. Panel B reports results for quartile subsamples based on year-end 2007 market cap. Panel C includes results
on four different subsamples. The ban dummy (BAN) equals one on stock days for which short selling is banned in the
relevant stock and is zero otherwise. Shorting and volume measures are based on NYSE, NASDAQ, and BATS activity
during regular trading hours. RELSS is shorting volume divided by share volume. Control variables include pairwise
differences in market cap and daily dollar trading volume (DVOL) in $millions, intraday price range (RVOL), and share
price (VWAP); control variable coefficients are only reported in Panel A. Coefficients of DVOL and MKT CAP are
multiplied by 106. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ , using standard errors clustered
by both firm and date.
most reliable effect on large-cap stocks. RELSS, the fraction of trading volume
involving a short seller, is perhaps the easiest measure to interpret. In the
smallest quartile, RELSS declines by 3.0 percentage points, and this decline is
only marginally statistically significant. By contrast, the reliability of the effect
increases monotonically with size, and in the two largest-cap quartiles, shorting
as a fraction of volume falls by a strongly significant 13.6 and 19.9 percentage
points.
Panel C of Table 3 reports results for other subsamples of interest. For
example, there is much less shorting during the ban of our subsample of
eight systemically important firms, with RELSS falling by 14.6 percentage
points. In the industry match subsample, where we require the banned and
nonbanned control stocks to have the same three-digit SIC code, RELSS falls
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by a statistically significant 11.0 percentage points. Finally, firms that were
added later to the ban list and firms that are withdrawn from the list before
the ban ended show significant ban-induced declines in RELSS of 15.8% and
74.6%, respectively.
4.2 Effects on bid-ask spreads
Does the presence of short sellers tend to improve or worsen liquidity? In this
section we use the shorting ban to investigate this question. The evidence in the
previous section shows that the shorting ban eliminated a substantial subset of
trading activity. Brogaard (2011) shows that high-frequency trading accounts
for more than 50% of trading volume in recent years, making HFT an important
source of short selling. In addition, the direct evidence in Menkveld (2013)
indicates that high-frequency liquidity providers could account for a good bit of
the observed shorting activity. Many of the high-frequency, or, more generally,
algorithmic traders are not registered market makers and thus would be subject
to the ban. This suggests that the shorting ban might worsen market liquidity,
even though the ban contains an exception for registered market makers.
For each common stock each day, we calculate RES, the trade-weighted
proportional round-trip effective spread on all trades. The effective spread is
defined as twice the (proportional) distance between the trade price Pit in stock
i at time t and the quote midpoint Mit prevailing at the time of the trade:
RESit =2|Pit −Mit |/Mit . (2)
To calculate effective spreads, we use trades at all market venues, and we use
the national best bid and offer prices to calculate the quote midpoint prevailing
the second prior to the transaction. In a similar fashion, we also calculate RQSit ,
the proportional quoted spread based on the national best bid and offer prices.
However, we focus more on effective spreads, because transactions sometimes
take place at prices within the quoted bid and ask prices, due to the presence
of hidden orders or due to price improvement by intermediaries. Note that
spreads are really an illiquidity measure: The wider the effective spread or
quoted spread, the less liquid the stock.
We also calculate the five-minute price impact of a trade. We sign trades
as either buyer-initiated or seller-initiated based on the Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm, and the price impact measures the proportional distance the quote
midpoint moves in the direction of the trade.8 For buyer-initiated trades, the
price impact measure RPI5it is measured as
RPI5it =(Mi,t+5min −Mit )/Mit , (3)
which is the proportional difference between the quote midpoint five minutes
after the trade and the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the trade. For
8 Chakrabarty, Moulton, and Shkilko (2012) compare the Lee-Ready trade classification algorithm to the true trade
direction from order data. They find that misclassification rates for both short and long sales are near zero at the
daily level, which means that our daily effective spread measures should be quite accurate.
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seller-initiated trades, the price impact is the same proportional price change
but of opposite sign.Again, price impacts are an illiquidity measure: The bigger
the price impact, the more a given trade tends to push the price over the next
five minutes.
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the various groups of stocks
in various intervals of time. For each group of stocks, we calculate a time-
series average over the stated time interval and then calculate a cross-sectional
mean. We focus on effective spreads, but the results for quoted spreads are
very similar. During the August 1 to September 18 preban period, for example,
average effective spreads are 2.78% for stocks on the initial ban list and 2.56%
for the set of matching stocks. These are fairly wide average spreads, reflecting
the fact that the sample contains many inactive, small-cap stocks.
While the shorting ban is in effect, these market quality measures diverge
considerably. Average effective spreads widen to 3.62% for the control stocks,
but effective spreads for the stocks on the initial ban list widen more, to an
average of 4.26%.9 Statistical inference is conducted via panel regressions using
all 727×2=1,454 sample stocks, including stocks that are added to the shorting
ban list after September 19. Recall that the panel regressions employ matched
pairs and include firm-specific dummies as well as other control variables,
so broad market effects are eliminated, and the change in market quality is
identified by comparing otherwise similar banned and nonbanned stocks on a
given day. Based on the full-sample numbers in Panel A of Table 4, the shorting
ban is associated with quoted spreads that are 35 basis points wider (t =4.47),
and effective spreads that are also 35 basis points wider (t =5.45). Price impacts
show an increase as well; the shorting ban is associated with a ten-basis-point
increase in five-minute price impacts (t =3.96).
Table 4, Panel B, breaks out the results by market cap and confirms the earlier
graphical evidence. Market quality worsens for the three largest market-cap
quartiles. For the effective spread panel regression, for instance, the coefficient
on the ban dummy is 65, 57, and 35 basis points for quartiles 2, 3, and
4, respectively. In contrast, for the small cap quartile, market quality (as
measured by quoted spreads, effective spreads, or five-minute price impact)
is not statistically different during the shorting ban. This is not particularly
surprising given that the level of shorting activity does not reliably change for
these firms during the ban, but it contrasts with Beber and Pagano’s (2013)
finding that small stocks suffer a greater decline in liquidity. We believe that
the discrepancy arises from the different empirical approaches. We measure the
domestic effect of the U.S. ban only, whereas Beber and Pagano’s panel design
gives substantially greater weight to firms in countries with longer-lasting and
broader shorting bans. For example, Japan and South Korea, both experiencing
9 It is possible that declining prices mechanically cause higher relative spread, especially if spreads are near the
minimum tick size. However, Beber and Pagano (2013) find no clustering at the minimum tick spread for the
United States, so this does not appear to be a problem in our sample.
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Table 4
The effect of the shorting ban on market quality
Panel A: Coefficients in matched sample panel regressions (727 pairs)
Dep. variable BAN DVOL MKT CAP RVOL VWAP Adj. R2 (%)
RQS 0.0035∗∗∗ −2.9460∗∗∗ 0.0214 0.0588∗∗∗ 90.0525∗∗ 37
RES 0.0035∗∗∗ −3.2123∗∗∗ 0.0513 0.0677∗∗∗ 49.7666∗∗ 30
RPI5 0.0010∗∗∗ −1.4293∗∗∗ 0.0342∗ 0.0321∗∗∗ 10.8682 10
RRS5 0.0015∗∗∗ −0.3375 −0.0188 0.0033 30.1516 12
RVOL 0.0144∗∗∗ 49.5958∗∗∗ −0.9587 −917.1359∗∗∗ 23
Panel B: Ban dummy coefficients for regressions on market cap quartile subsamples
Dep. variable Quartile 1 (smallest) Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 (largest)
RQS −0.0047 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗
RES 0.0002 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗
RPI5 −0.0003 0.0013∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
RRS5 0.0011 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0010∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
RVOL −0.0138∗∗ 0.0099∗ 0.0242∗∗∗ 0.0342∗∗∗
Number of pairs 181 182 182 182
Panel C: Ban dummy coefficients for regressions on various sample subsets
Dep. variable (A) Largest
TARP firms
(B) Industry
match
(C) Later additions
only
(D) Withdrawn
firms
RQS 0.0008∗∗ 0.0012∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
RES 0.0006∗∗ 0.0010∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0065∗
RPI5 0.0002 0.0004 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0010
RRS5 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0052∗∗∗
RVOL 0.0535∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗ 0.0146
Number of pairs 8 62 61 4
This table reports how a shorting ban affects market quality. Firm fixed effects regressions of various market
quality measures on a ban dummy and other explanatory variables, using a daily panel of matched stock pairs
from 8/1/2008 to 10/31/2008. Each sample stock subject to the shorting ban is matched to a similar stock for
which shorting was not banned (see Table 2 for details). Panel A presents results for the overall sample of
727 matched stock pairs. Panel B reports results for quartile subsamples based on year-end 2007 market cap.
Panel C includes results on four subsamples. The dependent variable in each regression is the relevant difference
between the banned stock and its nonbanned match. The ban dummy (BAN) equals one on stock days for which
short selling is banned in the relevant stock and is zero otherwise. Dependent variables include time-weighted
relative quoted spreads (RQS), trade-weighted relative effective spreads (RES), and equal-weighted five-minute
price impacts (RPI5) and five-minute realized spreads (RRS5), each of which is scaled by the prevailing quote
midpoint. Relative range (RVOL) is a day’s highest trade price minus the lowest price, divided by the day’s
VWAP. Control variables include pairwise differences in market cap and daily dollar trading volume (DVOL) in
$millions, intraday price range (RVOL), and share price (VWAP); control variable coefficients are only reported
in PanelA. Coefficients of DVOLand MKT CAPare multiplied by 1012, and coefficients for VWAPare multiplied
by 106. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and1% level is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, using standard errors clustered
by both firm and date.
bans that lasted more than seven months and cover all stocks, account for 62%
of the ban days in Beber and Pagano’s sample (see their Table 1). In contrast,
ban days of U.S. firms, where the ban lasts only 19 days and is largely limited to
financial firms, account for only 1% of ban days in that sample. As a result, the
U.S. effect does not have a major impact on their inferences. Moreover, firm size
likely varies systematically across countries. As a result, Beber and Pagano’s
large cap versus small cap test (see their Table 5), which does not include
country-level variables or effects, potentially contrast nationality rather than
firm size. These differences in empirical design make it difficult to compare the
inferences regarding firm size. In particular, our result that the ban has stronger
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effects on larger firms is not necessarily inconsistent with Beber and Pagano’s
results.
Figure 2 shows the daily evolution of average effective spreads for the four
market-cap quartiles, and Figure 3 provides a similar set of graphs for five-
minute price impacts. The liquidity changes are particularly dramatic for large-
cap stocks. In particular, the gap between large-cap ban stocks and control
stocks opens up immediately at the start of the shorting ban, and stocks subject to
the shorting ban remain extremely illiquid throughout the ban period. Effective
spreads for large-cap ban stocks average 76 basis points during the shorting ban,
compared with 29 basis points outside of the ban period. Analogous spreads
for control stocks are 30 basis points during the ban versus 23 basis points pre-
and postban. Once the ban ends, effective spreads and price impacts for the
two groups move much closer together, though they do not coincide again until
the end of October. Interestingly, liquidity remains very poor for both sets of
stocks, perhaps because stock market volatility remains extremely high.
Although it is hard to imagine, given the magnitude and timing of the market-
quality effects, it is possible that the degraded market quality during the shorting
ban is due solely to confounding contemporaneous changes in the information
environment, including the tremendous volatility of financial firm fundamentals
and the rapid pace of news about TARP and other matters. We address this in
several different ways. First, we add an industry match, which limits the analysis
to industries in which some firms were banned and some were not. This removes
nearly all pure financial firms but leaves sixty-two pairs of stocks for analysis.
We also examine two subsets of firms that were added to or removed from the
shorting ban list after September 19. Last, but not least, we examine the end of
the ban in Section 5.1, where there are fewer potentially confounding events.
Panel C of Table 4 has the results for various subsamples. For the subsample
that includes an industry match, effective spreads on ban stocks widen by
ten basis points (t =1.89) relative to control stocks. This is only marginally
significant, probably because of a reduction in the power of the tests since the
industry match requirement reduces the sample size by over 90%. There are
similar marginally significant results for quoted spreads; price impacts do not
change significantly.
Panel C also has the results for sixty-one firms that are added to the ban
list later. For that sample, effective spreads widen by an average of thirty-three
basis points (t =5.59), and quoted spreads widen by virtually identical amounts.
For this subsample, price impacts are reliably higher as well, increasing by
fourteen basis points on average (t =5.32). Column (D) of Table 4, Panel C,
has the results for the four firms that withdraw from the ban list and meet our
sample requirements. During the period that these firms are subject to the ban,
quoted spreads and effective spreads are wider, though the effective spread
result is only marginally significant, most likely due to low power from the
small sample. Overall, the sharp widening of spreads seems to be a direct result
of the shorting ban.
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If the shorting ban removes some competing liquidity providers, the
remaining liquidity providers may be able to earn greater profits. Although we
cannot directly measure trading revenue earned by liquidity providers, realized
spreads are a generally recognized proxy for this quantity. Realized spreads
are the difference between the transaction price and the quote midpoint at
some later time, typically five minutes. This would exactly equal the trading
revenue earned by the liquidity supplier if the position is held for five minutes
and unwound at the then-current quote midpoint. Formally, the five-minute
proportional realized spread for a buyer-initiated transaction in stock i at time
t at price Pit is given by
RRS5it =2(Pit −Mi,t+5min)/Mit , (4)
where Mit is the quote midpoint prevailing at time t , and the realized spread
is doubled so that it can be directly compared to an effective spread or quoted
spread. Realized spreads for seller-initiated transactions have the opposite sign.
The full-sample matched-pair panel regressions are in Panel A of Table 4.
All else equal, realized spreads for affected stocks increase by an average of
fifteen basis points during the ban, and this effect is significant at the 1% level.
When we divide the full sample into quartiles based on market cap (Panel B of
Table 4), we find that realized spreads reliably increase for all but the smallest
quartile. Figure 4 shows the daily evolution of average realized spreads for
each of the quartiles.
For the smaller subsamples considered in Panel C of Table 4, the realized
spread ban dummy coefficients are all positive but only significant for the four
withdrawn firms. The lack of significance for these subgroups probably reflects
low power, as realized spreads tend to be fairly noisy. Overall, these results are
consistent with the hypothesis that there is less competition among liquidity
providers during the shorting ban, with increased profits for those that remain
as liquidity suppliers.
Overall, it seems quite clear that market quality is markedly worse for all
but the smallest stocks subject to the shorting ban. This makes sense, as the
shorting ban temporarily restricted many market participants that were not
formally market makers but typically would provide substantial amounts of
liquidity via shorting. These informal market makers are known to concentrate
their efforts in large-cap stocks (Brogaard 2011), so their absence would not be
as keenly felt in smaller stocks.
4.3 Stock price volatility
The shorting ban is also associated with a large increase in price volatility, at
least for large-cap firms. We measure intraday volatility using the proportional
intraday range (RVOL), defined as the difference between the highest and
lowest transaction price recorded for a given stock on a given trading day,
divided by the stock’s volume-weighted average trade price for that day. Prior
to the ban, average intraday price ranges are 5.09% for stocks on the original
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SEC list versus 5.48% for the matched control stocks, based on the numbers in
Table 2. The descriptive statistics show that both groups of stocks experience a
sharp increase in intraday range volatility during the shorting ban (an average
of 9.33% for initial ban stocks versus 9.30% for control stocks). Note that
volatility remains high postban, averaging 9.64% for initial ban stocks versus
11.55% for control stocks.
Statistical tests for the differences in volatility are contained in Table 4, and
based on the full sample results in PanelA, the shorting ban is associated with an
additional 1.44 percentage points of intraday range (t =2.61). Table 4, Panel B,
and Figure 5 show that this result is driven by the two largest quartiles; in fact,
the smallest quartile goes in the opposite direction by a significant amount. For
the sixty-two banned firms that can be matched to a nonbanned firm in the same
industry, Panel C shows a significant increase in average daily range volatility
equal to 1.77 percentage points (t =2.27).
Increased volatility during the shorting ban could be due to the worsening
market quality, but it could also simply reflect greater tumult in the fundamentals
during this time period. Thus, we do not rely on the volatility results to draw
conclusions about the effect of the ban on market quality. We return to this
issue in Section 5.1, when we study the end of the ban in more detail.
4.4 Short-sale aggressiveness
Next, we examine whether the market makers who short during the shorting
ban are different from the population of short sellers at other times. Because
we have intraday data on the time and price of every executed short sale, we
can measure the average effective spread (in basis points) that short sellers pay.
For a transaction in stock i at time u, we measure the short seller’s proportional
effective spread Fiu as
Fiu =2(Miu−Piu)/Miu, (5)
where Piu is the price at which shares are sold short at time u, and Miu is
the prevailing quote midpoint at the time of the short sale. We scale by two
to make these effective spread numbers comparable to the broader market
effective spreads discussed earlier. We then compute trade-weighted averages
for each day to aggregate these individual-firm effective spreads up to a trading
day level. Note that this measure is positive if short-sellers demand liquidity
on average and negative if they supply liquidity on average. In addition, we
calculate the fraction of short sales that execute at prices below the prevailing
quote midpoint, Pit <Mit . These are referred to as aggressive short sales.
We also calculate the five-minute price impact for all short sales as in the
previous section, except that we use only executed short sales in the calculation.
Because we are only dealing with sales here, a positive price impact for short
sales measures the midquote decline in the five minutes after the short sale, and
it is a measure of the short-term informativeness of the short sale.
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Figure 6 graphs the daily average effective spreads for short sales for the
four market-cap quartiles over the course of the shorting ban. Again, the most
dramatic results are for large-cap stocks. For ban stocks and control stocks alike,
the preban effective spreads are generally quite close to zero, indicating that
liquidity demand and liquidity provision by short sellers roughly offset each
other. When the shorting ban takes effect, short sellers do not seem to change
their overall aggressiveness in nonbanned stocks, and there is no significant
change in short sale price impacts for this set of stocks. In contrast, those who
can still sell short are much more aggressive. This shorting aggressiveness
disappears almost immediately once the shorting ban ends.
Panel A of Table 5 has the full-sample panel regression results for short-sale
effective spreads and short-sale price impacts. During the shorting ban, those
who short sell affected stocks pay an additional twenty-five basis points in
effective spread, and short-sale price impacts are fourteen basis points higher in
the banned stocks. Panel B shows that the effective spread results are significant
for the two largest quartiles, whereas the results in Panel C indicate that the
aggressiveness result is not present in the other subsamples that we have
examined, most likely because these effective spreads paid by short sellers
are fairly noisy.
What explains the increase in effective spreads associated with short sales
during the shorting ban? The natural explanation is heterogeneity among short
sellers, which comes to light only during the ban. The only market participants
who can short sell during the ban are market makers, so the results simply
indicate that these traders tend to demand immediacy, whereas other short
sellers tend to supply immediacy. This makes sense given the nature of market
making. If an options market maker sells a put, for example, she will have
a strong desire to hedge that trade as quickly as possible and may use market
orders to eliminate her exposure to price moves in the underlying stock. Similar
arguments apply to any other market maker who finds himself with a need to
short to hedge away some sort of long exposure.
4.5 Effects on stock prices
If the disagreement models (e.g., Miller 1977) are correct and the shorting ban
temporarily prevents at least some pessimists from taking a bearish position in a
financial stock, the announcement of the shorting ban should temporarily cause
prices of affected stocks to rise. This “Miller” effect would lead to overvaluation
relative to the fundamentals. However, it is not clear that we should expect a
very large stock price effect, because a market participant could use ETFs, puts,
credit default swaps, or other derivative instruments to take a bearish position.
The main challenge is the presence of confounding events during the shorting
ban. On the same day that the shorting ban takes effect,Treasury secretary Henry
Paulson announces the creation of what came to be known as the TroubledAsset
Relief Program (TARP). It is not surprising that financial firm equity holders
would respond positively to the announcement of a program “to remove these
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Table 5
The effect of the shorting ban on shorting aggressiveness
Panel A: Coefficients in matched sample panel regressions (727 pairs)
Dep. variable BAN DVOL MKT CAP RVOL VWAP Adj. R2
(%)
Shorting RES 0.0025∗∗∗ −0.2457 0.0257 0.0020 −11.5584 8
Shorting RPI5 0.0014∗∗∗ −0.1071 0.0053 −0.0015 −1.9781 6
% aggressive shorting volume 0.0008 −2.7203 0.2964 0.0421 −88.7065 5
Shorting RES for aggressive shorts 0.0082∗∗∗ −2.3267∗∗∗ 0.0342 0.0457∗∗∗ 22.8121 19
Shorting RES for passive shorts −0.0049∗∗∗ 2.1041∗∗∗ −0.0202 −0.0465∗∗∗ −34.7839∗ 22
Panel B: Ban dummy coefficients for regressions on market cap quartile subsamples
Dep. variable Quartile 1
(smallest)
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(largest)
Shorting RES 0.0131 0.0018 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗
Shorting RPI5 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0018∗ 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0002
% aggressive shorting volume 0.0751∗∗∗ 0.0161 0.0172 −0.0259∗∗∗
Shorting RES for aggressive shorts −0.0019 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗
Shorting RES for passive shorts −0.0081 −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗
Number of pairs 181 182 182 182
Panel C: Ban dummy coefficients for regressions on various sample subsets
Dep. variable (A) Largest
TARP firms
(B) Industry
match
(C) Later additions
only
(D) Withdrawn
firms
Shorting RES 0.0000 0.0011 0.0016 0.0016
Shorting RPI5 −0.0006 0.0010∗∗ 0.0006 −0.0024
% aggressive shorting volume −0.0435∗∗ −0.0049 −0.0207 −0.0720
Shorting RES for aggressive shorts 0.0011∗∗ 0.0027∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0029
Shorting RES for passive shorts −0.0003 −0.0017∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0061∗
Number of pairs 8 62 61 4
This table reports how a shorting ban affects shorting aggressiveness. Firm fixed effects regressions of various
shorting aggressiveness measures on a ban dummy and other explanatory variables, using a daily panel of matched
stock pairs from 8/1/2008 to 10/31/2008. Each sample stock subject to the shorting ban is matched to a similar
stock for which shorting was not banned (see Table 2 for details). Panel A presents results for the overall sample
of 727 matched stock pairs. Panel B reports results for quartile subsamples based on year-end 2007 market cap.
Panel C includes results for subsamples. The dependent variable in each regression is the relevant difference
between the banned stock and its nonbanned match. The ban dummy (BAN) equals one on stock days for which
short selling is banned in the relevant stock and is zero otherwise. Dependent variables include the actual relative
effective spread received by executed short-sell orders (shorting RES), the five-minute price impact associated
with short orders (shorting RPI5), the percentage of short sales that execute at prices below the quote midpoint
(aggressive shorting volume fraction), and RES for short sales partitioned by aggressiveness. Control variables
include pairwise differences in market cap and daily dollar trading volume (DVOL) in $millions, intraday price
range (RVOL), and share price (VWAP); control variable coefficients are only reported in Panel A. Coefficients
of DVOL and MKT CAP are multiplied by 1012, and coefficients for VWAP are multiplied by 106. Significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, using standard errors clustered on both firm and
date.
illiquid assets that are weighing down our financial institutions and threatening
our economy.” In contrast to a “Miller” effect, a TARP-related price change
should be permanent and reflect the present value of the implied subsidy to our
sample firms.
Figure 7 shows equal-weighted cumulative raw and abnormal returns for the
665 sample stocks on the SEC’s original shorting ban list, divided into market-
cap quartiles, as well as cumulative returns for the set of matched control
stocks for which shorting is never banned. On Friday, September 19, prices
impound the news of the day, including the announcement and immediate
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implementation of the emergency shorting ban. The 665 banned stocks rise
by 6.68% that day, compared with an average 3.48% return for the matched
control stocks for which shorting is never banned.
Most notably, each of the cumulative return differences appears to be
permanent—there is no correction on October 9 when shorting resumes.
In fact, we find that banned stocks as a group outperform the matched
control firms by an average of about 30% through the end of 2008. This
aggregate return difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (data not
tabulated).
This indicates, at a minimum, that the price increases on September 19 do not
represent a Miller-type equilibrium. In fact, the 30% excess return over this time
period strikes us as a reasonable estimate of the value of the various government
support programs for the financial sector. Specifically, our sample firms subject
to the shorting ban have an aggregate market cap of $4.6 billion×727=$3.4
trillion. Thus, our estimated 30% abnormal return implies a subsidy of $1.1
trillion. This is not too far from the initial nominal TARP value of $700 billion
if one takes into account potential implied guarantees and risk assumptions that
were discussed at the time.
To try to escape the confounding news about TARP and fundamentals, we
look at the subset of firms that are added to the ban list at a later date. There are
sixty-two such firms in our sample, and they are matched in the same way to a
firm for which shorting is never banned. There are a handful of financial firms
in this group, but many if not most are nonfinancial firms with a financing arm.
For example, firms in this group include General Electric, General Motors,
and IBM. In addition to avoiding the contemporaneous confounding news
about TARP, these later additions should have share prices that are on average
much less sensitive to TARP news and other government efforts to stabilize the
financial sector.
Figure 8 displays the cumulative equally weighted excess returns on the
firms added later to the ban list versus their matched nonbanned counterparts.
The displayed confidence interval extends 1.96 standard deviations above and
below zero, calculated using excess return data for these firms during the pre-
event period from August 1 through September 17. The figure begins with the
announcement of the ban on September 19. Note that for these sixty-two firms,
average excess returns on this day are very close to zero (0.37%, to be precise).
This suggests that market participants initially do not expect the ban to benefit
these firms.As we continue to follow these firms, they gradually become subject
to the ban. The majority are added to the ban list over the next two days, with the
rest added over the course of the next two weeks. Interestingly, Figure 8 never
shows a price bump for these stocks as a group. They underperform the matched
sample during the entire ban interval, and this underperformance is borderline
statistically significant at the 5% level by October 8. This suggests that for
these stocks, any artificial price boost from the shorting ban is outweighed by
associated negative price effects.
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Cumulative abnormal returns on stocks later added to ban list
This figure plots cumulative abnormal returns for stocks added to the ban later. We compute cumulative returns
for 62 common stocks listed on NYSE or NASDAQ that were subject to the shorting ban but were not on the
original list of stocks in which shorting was banned and for a set of 62 matched control firms that are not subject
to the shorting ban. For each day from September 18, 2008 through October 31, 2008, we report the daily equal-
weighted average of cumulative abnormal returns, computed as the difference between ban firms and control
firms. Control firms are matched by option status, listing exchange, market cap, and dollar trading volume. We
also report 95% confidence intervals for the cumulative abnormal return (based on pre-event volatility from
August 1 through September 17).
Overall, largely consistent with Beber and Pagano (2013), we see
little concrete evidence that the shorting ban caused a temporary upward
bump in prices. We can attribute the positive abnormal returns around
the ban implementation date to the TARP subsidies that are announced
contemporaneously. Moreover, the evidence in fact points the other direction
for companies that asked to be added to the ban list and then experience negative
returns, most likely due to the negative signal associated with that request.
5. Further Analysis
5.1 End of the ban
As noted earlier, the period fromAugust 2008 to October 2008 is quite eventful.
For instance, on the same day the ban was implemented, TARP was also
announced, albeit with very few details. Given the contemporaneous news
concerning the financial sector, and given that many initiatives to support the
financial sector were announced and/or implemented around the same time, it
is challenging to separately identify the effects of the shorting ban. The end of
the ban may be cleaner, as there are no major confounding policy initiatives,
and there are fewer major headlines concerning the financial sector during
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this period. Thus, in this subsection we examine the period surrounding the
expiration of the shorting ban.
Figures 1 through 7 suggest that the market quality in affected stocks
improves right away as the ban ends. To conduct statistical inference, we use
the matched-pair daily panel regression framework. Specifically, we compare
the last week of the shorting ban to each of the first three weeks following
its expiration. Taking the expiration date to be event day zero, we compare
the shorting ban interval [−5, −1] to event day window [0,4], event-day
window [5,9], and event-day window [10,14] by estimating specifications of
the following form using data from event day −5 to +14 for matched pair i on
day t :
Yit =αi +β1D
POST1
it +β2D
POST2
it +β3D
POST3
it +θXit +εit , (6)
where Yit is the shorting, activity, or market-quality measure Y for the banned
stock less the analogous value for its nonbanned match; Xit is the same vector
of controls as before; and DPOST1 is an indicator variable set equal to one if
and only if the data comes from the first week after the ban expires (event days
0 to 4), with DPOST2 and DPOST3 defined similarly for the second and third
postban week (event days 5 to 9 and event days 10 to 14, respectively). Here,
the matched-pair fixed effect is the conditional mean during the last week of
the ban, so the coefficients on the postban indicator variables reflect changes
from the last week of the ban to the relevant postban period.
The results are in Table 6 and formalize the graphical evidence from the
figures. We focus on the results for the first week after the ban expires; the
results for later periods are mainly included to check whether there are any
lagged effects or temporary effects on shorting and market quality postban. For
all but the smallest quartile of stocks, short selling in affected stocks rebounds
immediately, and quoted and effective spreads on affected stocks narrow in the
first week after the ban expires. In the large-cap quartile, for example, shorting
as a fraction of volume increases by 12.36 percentage points in the first week
postban, and proportional effective spreads narrow by 17 basis points. Price
impacts also decline significantly for the top two size quartiles, though realized
spreads narrow significantly only in quartile 2. In the large-cap quartile, short
sellers become slightly less aggressive. Excluding the smallest quartile, spreads
continue to narrow further in the second and third week postban.
In contrast, the range volatility measure does not decline immediately when
the ban ends. As discussed earlier, this measure mixes market quality with
fundamental volatility, and there are sharp daily moves in financial sector stock
prices on end-of-ban event day 0 and event day +1. In fact, given that bid-ask
spreads are positively related to the volatility of fundamentals, all else equal,
a postban improvement in market quality in the presence of continued high
volatility is even more notable. Overall, we find that our main conclusions hold
when we limit our analysis to the expiration of the shorting ban.
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Table 6
The end of the shorting ban
Size quartile 1 (smallest) postban dummies Size quartile 2 postban dummies
Dependent variable day [0,4] day [5,9] day [10,14] day [0,4] day [5,9] day [10,14]
Shorting volume 140 734∗ −51 968 −585 −99
Number of shorts 3 4∗ 3 9 19∗∗∗ 11
RELSS 0.0069 0.0332 0.0478∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ −0.0139
DVOL 18,171∗∗ 23,987∗ 19,826∗∗ 46,389 66,097 51,965
# of trades 2 12∗∗ 8 16 31∗∗∗ 36∗∗∗
RQS 0.0048 0.0020 0.0014 −0.0063∗∗ −0.0045 −0.0098∗∗∗
RES 0.0037 0.0002 −0.0044 −0.0048∗∗ −0.0072∗∗ −0.0080∗∗∗
RPI5 −0.0038∗ 0.0006 −0.0010 0.0001 −0.0018∗∗ −0.0009
RRS5 0.0114∗ −0.0024 −0.0005 −0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0062∗∗∗ −0.0038∗∗∗
RVOL −0.0016 0.0109 0.0039 −0.0123 −0.0105 −0.0118
Shorting RES 0.0123 −0.0005 −0.0021 0.0026 0.0014 −0.0020
Size quartile 3 postban dummies Size quartile 4 (largest) postban dummies
day [0,4] day [5,9] day [10,14] day [0,4] day [5,9] day [10,14]
Shorting volume 31,929∗∗∗ 25,344∗∗∗ 41,465∗∗∗ 955,558∗∗ 979,772∗∗∗ 1,168,607∗∗∗
Number of shorts 213∗∗∗ 223∗∗∗ 309∗∗∗ 4362∗∗ 4865∗∗∗ 5156∗∗∗
RELSS 0.1236∗∗∗ 0.1206∗∗∗ 0.1310∗∗∗ 0.1236∗∗∗ 0.1618∗∗∗ 0.1840∗∗∗
DVOL 327,770 1,005,403∗ 1,443,186∗∗∗ 15,664,297 3,674,999 −4,026,798
Number of trades 196 352∗∗∗ 395∗∗∗ 2,128 1,899∗∗∗ 1,309
RQS −0.0036∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0062∗∗∗ −0.0020∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0035∗∗∗
RES −0.0027∗∗ −0.0038∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗ −0.0017∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0030∗∗∗
RPI5 −0.0013∗∗ −0.0020∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0014∗∗∗
RRS5 0.0000 −0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001
RVOL 0.0109 −0.0160∗∗ −0.0031 0.0121 −0.0240∗∗∗ −0.0157∗∗∗
Shorting RES −0.0021 −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0018 −0.0020∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗
This table reports how key shorting activity, market quality, and shorting aggressiveness change around the end
of the shorting ban for different size quartiles. Daily panel matched pair regressions with firm fixed effects using
only data from day −5 to day +14 relative to the ban expiration date. Each sample stock subject to the shorting ban
is matched to a similar stock for which shorting was not banned (see Table 2 for details). A postban dummy equals
one if the observation is in the relevant five-day postban window (postban event days [0,4], [5,9], or [10,14]).
Only coefficients on postban dummies are reported; unreported control variables include pairwise differences in
market cap and daily dollar trading volume (DVOL) in $millions, intraday price range (RVOL), and share price
(VWAP). Shorting and trading volume measures aggregate BATS, NYSE, and NASDAQ activity during regular
trading hours. RELSS is shorting volume divided by share volume. Dependent variables also include time-
weighted relative quoted spreads (RQS), trade-weighted relative effective spreads (RES), and equal-weighted
five-minute price impact (RPI5). Each of these three measures is scaled by the quote midpoint. Relative range
is a day’s highest trade price minus the lowest price, divided by the day’s VWAP. Other dependent variables are
the actual relative effective spread accrued by executed short-sell orders (shorting RES), the five-minute price
impact associated with short orders (shorting RPI5), the percentage of short sales that execute at prices below
the quote midpoint (aggressive shorting volume fraction), and RES for short sales partitioned by aggressiveness.
We estimate these models separately for stock pairs in each market cap quartile. Significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level is indicated by ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, using standard errors clustered on both firm and date.
5.2 Existing shorting constraints
In this subsection, we examine whether the impact of the short sale ban is
different for hard-to-borrow stocks. The main hypothesis is that for hard-to-
borrow stocks, shorting is already somewhat restricted, so the ban should have
a smaller effect on these stocks, all else equal. During September 2008, we
have proprietary daily reports from a large prime broker listing stocks that are
easy to borrow. Stocks not on this list are considered hard to borrow. Clients are
expected to contact the prime broker before shorting hard-to-borrow stocks, to
determine whether the prime broker can locate loanable shares. Most stocks
are in fact easy to borrow: An average of around 5,300 stocks appear on this
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list each day. Based on the twelve trading days from September 2 through
September 17, we calculate the fraction of days on which a stock is hard to
borrow. The hard-to-borrow measure for each matched pair is the difference
between the banned stock and its nonbanned match, and the hard-to-borrow
indicator variable DHTBi is set equal to one if and only if the hard-to-borrow
measure for matched pair i is above the cross-sectional median.
To assess whether the shorting ban affects hard-to-borrow stocks differently,
we augment the basic panel regression specification (1) with an interacted
indicator variable:
Yit =αi +βD
BAN
it +δD
BAN
it D
HTB
i +θXit +εit , (7)
and we report the results in Panel A of Table 7. For stocks in the top two size
quartiles, hard-to-borrow stocks are significantly less affected by the shorting
ban. There is less of a decline in the amount of shorting and less degradation
in market quality measures. For example, in the large-cap quartile, effective
spreads for financial stocks that are easy to borrow widen by thirty-eight basis
points during the ban. The widening for hard-to-borrow stocks is only twenty-
two basis points. In sum, the evidence supports the hypothesis that a tight share
lending market already imposes restrictions on shorting, and thus the effect of
the shorting ban is smaller (but still nonzero) for these stocks.10
5.3 Algorithmic trading
As mentioned earlier, we hypothesize that liquidity is damaged during the
shorting ban because informal market makers are prohibited from shorting
and are thus unable to effectively provide liquidity on one side of the market.
If true, the effects of the shorting ban should be more severe for stocks for
which informal market makers are relatively more important. We do not have
data that separates out these market makers. However, informal market-making
strategies are a subset of algorithmic or high-frequency (AT-HFT) strategies,
and stocks with moreAT-HFT could have a greater incidence of informal market
making.
BATS was the third largest trading venue in the United States at the time of
the shorting ban. It was a favored destination for AT-HFT because of its low
latencies. Thus, we use BATS market share as a proxy for the prevalence of AT-
HFT in a given stock. We hypothesize that stocks with a greater BATS market
share are more likely to experience more informal market making across all
trading venues, and we expect these stocks to fare worse in terms of liquidity
during the shorting ban.
10 In unreported tests, we regress preban effective spreads on a hard-to-borrow dummy and controls for market cap,
volatility, dollar volume, and VWAP. Hard-to-borrow has a significantly positive coefficient, whether we use
cross-sectional or firm-day panels to estimate the model. This suggests that shorting constraints have a detrimental
effect on liquidity even outside the ban period. This is also consistent with a ban-induced deterioration of liquidity,
because the ban directly affects shorting difficulty.
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The methodological approach is quite similar to that used in the hard-to-
borrow analysis. We compute AT-HFT intensity each day for each sample stock
as BATS trading volume over total market volume during August 2008. The
AT-HFT intensity measure for each matched pair is the difference between
the banned stock and its nonbanned match, and the AT-HFT indicator variable
DAT−HFTi is set equal to one if and only if the AT-HFT measure for matched pair
i during August 2008 is above the cross-sectional median. We then interact the
shorting ban dummy with the AT-HFT indicator in the daily matched pair panel
regressions:
Yit =αi +βD
BAN
it +δD
BAN
it D
AT−HFT
i +θXit +εit , (8)
and we test whether δ=0. We estimate separate regressions for each of the
market-cap quartiles, and the results are in Panel B of Table 7.
Almost none of the coefficients on the interaction variable are significantly
different from zero. During the ban, stocks with moreAT-HFT see similar drops
in shorting activity and similar spread widening. It could be that informal market
making is not the key mechanism underpinning the earlier results. It could be the
case that BATS market share in a given stock is not a good proxy for the overall
importance of informal market making across all trading venues. Finally, if there
is little cross-sectional variation in the importance of informal market making,
after controlling for observables, such as market cap and trading volume, this
could also explain the insignificant regression results. Unfortunately, a more
definitive test of our hypothesized mechanism may await better, more detailed
data on the identities and activities of certain groups of high-frequency traders.11
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we study the September 2008 SEC emergency order that temporar-
ily banned most short sales in nearly 1,000 financial stocks. Using proprietary
data from the NYSE, NASDAQ, and BATS, we show that shorting activity
drops by an average of 77% in affected large-cap stocks. The remaining short
sellers (who should be exclusively market makers) tend to demand immediacy,
probably to quickly satisfy their hedging needs. Small-cap stocks were largely
unaffected, but large-cap stocks subject to the ban suffered a severe degradation
in market quality, as measured by quoted and effective spreads, price impacts,
and realized spreads. Market quality is less affected for stocks with pre-existing
shorting restrictions. Banned stocks jump in price, but this appears to be due
to the anticipated bailout programs rather than the shorting ban.
Market quality worsens because many algorithmic traders cannot act as
informal market makers during the shorting ban. With less competition in
11 Using a similar test design as for hard-to-borrow and high-frequency-trading stocks, we also test whether
institutional ownership or option listing status affect the effect of the ban on market quality. The interaction
coefficients tend to have high standard errors, and the analysis does not add significant insights to the tabulated
results in Table 7.
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liquidity provision, the remaining “formal” market makers are able to earn
greater rents at the expense of those demanding liquidity.
Given the evidence, it is not at all clear that the SEC achieved its unstated
goal of artificially raising prices on financial stocks, and it is clear that market
quality was severely compromised. Should the SEC have done it? Although it
may seem clear that the answer is no, it is certainly possible that manipulative
shorting was a risk for financial stocks during this time period. Goldstein and
Guembel (2008) show that short sellers have an incentive to manipulate if
they can somehow cause the company to experience negative real effects, and
starting a Diamond-Dybvig (1983) bank run could theoretically lead to a share
price of zero. However, Khanna and Mathews (2012) emphasize that the firm’s
shareholders have every incentive to counter actions taken by manipulative
short sellers. In fact, earlier in American history, bank managers and owners
were well acquainted with this possibility, and most banks were privately held
as a result. Another possibility is that this was a time when we needed financial
stocks to be overvalued. Perhaps systemic risk imposes negative externalities
throughout the system, and it was optimal for the SEC to artificially support
financial stocks to reduce systemic risk. Nevertheless, these somewhat elusive
benefits would need to be quite large to offset the large costs that market
participants experienced in terms of larger transactions costs and elevated
volatility.
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